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ABSTRACT 
The dissolution of the Soviet Union left Russia without efficient military power and with 
a tumbled-down defense industry that are critically important to support its resurfaced 
superpower ambitions. This obstacle could be overcome by substituting military power 
with the economic one through domination as the leading energy supplier. Establishment 
of governmental control over the energy sector became a key element of the Russian 
domestic policy that would convert the energy resources into the instrument of the state’s 
power. 
All major energy transportation routes between Russian energy producers and 
European consumers are in possession of the former Soviet republics. Russia has become 
heavily dependent on these countries as energy transit intermediaries. To ensure 
consistency of the energy supply flow and to lessen Russia’s reliance on the transit states, 
Russia is seeking ways to diversify energy transportation routes to Europe. Russia is 
willing to pay a significantly higher cost for a complex construction of new pipelines that 
bypass intermediaries. The establishment of Russian monopolistic control over energy 
flow to Europe might be converted into a regional political dominance. Threatening the 
possibility of abrupt energy disruption and price manipulation could become an efficient 
tool of state power to achieve Russia’s political objectives. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
A. BACKGROUND 
After the resignation of Boris Yeltsin, the first president of the Russian Federation 
after the dissolution of the USSR, on December 31, 1999, and de facto appointment of his 
successor, Vladimir Putin, Russia entered a new political era. What Putin inherited from 
his predecessor was the state with poor economy, a lot of external debts left after the state 
default of 1998, and a political decision-making system strongly influenced by a group of 
rich people known as the oligarchs, who owned major capital assets of Russia.1 
Those tycoons controlled major businesses in the country. They gained such 
political influence by playing a significant role in Yeltsin’s presidential campaign back in 
1996, supporting him through the mass media owned by the oligarchs. For that reason, 
being under protection of the country’s top leadership, the oligarchs were actually above 
the law or were  under favorable legal conditions for conducting their businesses without 
significant obstacles. Thus, politics and business became tightly interconnected and 
interdependent.2 
The main characteristic of Russian business was its ability to get money 
effortlessly from the thin air. Upon dismantling of the Soviet Union, the new Russian 
political leadership proclaimed a transition to the free market economy. Such a transition 
requires, among other things, development of sufficient legislation and its transparent 
implementation. Unfortunately, development of the free market economy and appropriate 
legal institutions was not coordinated; application of laws throughout the country was 
vague. At the same time, the then still state-owned resources were vast. The socialist 
approach to collective ownership of state property could be portrayed as “shared property 
means no one’s property.” That approach created a fertile precondition for property that 
used to be owned by the now non-existent state of the Soviet Union to be rapidly grasped 
by those people who were at the right place at the right time and with a sufficient 
                                                 
1 David E. Hoffman, The Oligarchs: Wealth and Power in the New Russia (New York: Public Affairs, 
2003), 3. 
2 Ibid., 348–364. 
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business mindset. Furthermore, seven decades of the Soviet system suppressed any signs 
of entrepreneurship among the people, and the people’s almost total reliance on state 
subsidies was conducive to the appearance of the deep gap between rich and poor people. 
Therefore, during the transformation period from state-owned to private property, major 
capital in Russia easily became controlled by tycoons.3 
Thus, Vladimir Putin, when he came to power, had to deal with recovering the 
economy after the recent default, the socioeconomic instability, and chaotic policy 
making significantly affected by business interests. As he stated, “Russia is in the midst 
of one of the most difficult periods in its history. For the first time in the past 200–300 
years, it is facing a real threat of sliding down into the second, and possibly even third, 
echelon of world states.”4  
His aspiration as a nation’s leader was clear: reemergence of Russia as a 
superpower. It appeared that Vladimir Putin had his own view on how to return to Russia 
its economic and political influence. In his dissertation, he literally outlined an action 
plan for restoring Russia’s former prosperity. He stated that the Russian government 
should “reassert its control over the country’s abundant natural resources and raw 
materials.”5 Luckily enough, the demand for natural resources was rapidly growing by 
the time of Putin’s first presidency, causing the subsequent oil-price growth and 
increasing the state’s collected revenue. The resulting monetary resources allowed Putin 
to build up and further strengthen his domestic power.  
Once in power, several practical steps were taken to accomplish his “plan.” To 
eliminate competitors, Putin’s regime liquidated two major players in the domestic 
energy markets: Yukos and Sibneft. The former was plundered,6 and the latter one was 
put under government control by compelling the owner to sell its major stakes to 
Gazprom.7 Former owners of both companies suffered: the first one was sentenced to 
                                                 
3 Ibid., 6. 
4 Stephen K. Wegren and Dale R. Herspring, eds., After Putin’s Russia: Past Imperfect, Future 
Uncertain, 4th ed. (New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2010), 1. 
5 Marshall I. Goldman, Petrostate: Putin, Power, and the New Russia (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2010), 97. 
6 Ibid., 120. 
7 Goldman, Petrostate, 123. 
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prison (and currently is still in jail); the second one is in exile. Furthermore, eventually 
Gazprom itself, the energy giant, went under full control of the Russian government (50 
percent plus one share belong to Russia’s government). Hence, the control over 
extraction and outflow of minerals was handled by the political leadership. 
Obviously, Europe’s growing energy consumption and energy demand, which is 
prompting Europe to seek diversification of resource suppliers to reduce its over-
dependence on Middle East fossil fuels exports8 and almost unlimited natural gas, and 
Russia’s vast oil and natural gas resources perfectly fit with Putin’s plan. Indeed, to have 
the advantage of monopolizing the European energy market, a complete control over 
transportation routes is required. Then, Russia could ensure stable income in the long run 
because Russia’s revenue critically depends on mineral exports. But major gas flow goes 
through transit states, such as Ukraine and Belarus. The importance of Ukraine cannot be 
overestimated since Russia exports almost 80 percent of its natural gas through the 
Ukrainian pipeline transport system.9   
Some tensions happened between Russia and those transit states. In both cases, 
there were disagreements on gas and gas transit prices between Russia and the transit 
intermediaries. In the case of Belarus, the parties found consensus without threatening 
gas transit to Europe; however, the tensions between Russia and Ukraine reached a point 
at which the gas flow through Ukrainian territory was discontinued, leaving Europe 
without a gas supply for two weeks in 2009.10 Using this precedent, Russia tried to 





                                                 
8 Ibid., 136. 
9 Oksana Shevelkova, “Экспорт российского газа через Украину резко вырос и тут же начал 
снижаться” (“Russian Gas Export through Ukraine Rose Rapidly and Immediately Began Declining”), 
Деловая Газета “Маркер” (Business Newspaper Marker), July 5, 2010, accessed December 8, 2011, 
http://www.marker.ru/news/1217. 
10 “Газовый конфликт Украины и России имеет политический аспект – Ющенко” (“Gas Conflict 
between Ukraine and Russia is Politically Motivated - Yuschenko”), RIANOVOSTI, January 15, 2009, 
accessed December 8, 2011, http://ria.ru/gas/20090115/159336537.html. 
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developing several new projects, such as Nord Stream under the Baltic Sea and South 
Stream under the Black Sea, bypassing Ukraine and highlighting that Ukraine is an 
unreliable transit state.11  
To reduce its dependence on a single natural-gas supplier, Europe is seeking ways 
to diversify energy supplies. The Nabucco pipeline, backed by the United States and 
European Union, is a major project bypassing Russia and is a rival to Russia’s South 
Stream. It originates in the Caspian basin, goes through South Caucasus, Turkey, 
Bulgaria, Romania, and Hungary, and terminates in Austria.12 Economically, Nabucco 
looks more attractive because it is three times cheaper to build than South Stream. 
However, NABUCCO faces a major obstacle of whether there is going to be enough 
volume of gas provided for the pipe to operate. One of the key planned suppliers for 
NABUCCO pipeline was Iran. But current disagreement over Iran’s nuclear program and 
the variety of economic sanctions imposed by the leading nations give Iran no credibility 
as a reliable supplier in the long run. Other possible Central Asia suppliers are unlikely to 
be key suppliers due to a long-running dispute over Caspian Sea legal status; Russia is a 
key player because the pipeline connection is needed to link Central Asia and South 
Caucasus.13  
Russia took further steps towards monopolizing control of the gas flow to Europe. 
In November 2006, Russian Gazprom and Italian Eni, the two biggest state-controlled oil 
and gas companies in Russia and Italy, signed a “Strategic Partnership Agreement” on the 
direct Russian natural gas delivery to the Italian market, followed by the establishment of 
the South Stream AG company on January 18, 2008, being registered in Switzerland.14 
Furthermore, between 2006 and 2010, Russia signed intergovernmental bilateral 
                                                 
11The Economist, “An Annual Spat between Russia and Ukraine over Gas Supplies Turns Nasty,” 
January 7, 2009, accessed December 8, 2011, http://www.economist.com/node/12884378. 
12 Stefan Nicola, “Analysis: Europe’s Pipeline War,” UPI, February 5, 2008, 
http://www.upi.com/Business_News/Energy-Resources/2008/02/05/Analysis-Europes-pipeline-war/UPI-
24561202258576/. 
13 Jason Bush, “The Great Pipeline Race: Russia’s South Stream Project Gets a Boost,” Spiegel 
Online International, May 19, 2009, accessed June 8, 2012, 
http://www.spiegel.de/international/business/0,1518,625697,00.html. 
14 South Stream: Europe’s Energy Security, “Italy,” accessed on December 11, 2011, http://south-
stream.info/index.php?id=16&L=1. 
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agreements on participation in the South Stream project with Bulgaria, Serbia, Hungary, 
Greece, Slovenia, Croatia, and, finally, Austria15 (Figure 1). 
 
 
Figure 1.   South Stream Gas Pipeline Planned Route.16 
  
 
Figure 2.   Nord Stream Gas Pipeline Route.17  
                                                 
15 South Stream: Europe’s Energy Security, “Facts and Figures,” accessed December 11, 2011, 
http://south-stream.info/index.php?id=14&L=1 
16 “South Stream Gas Pipeline Planed Route,” accessed June 5, 2012, http://south-
stream.info/fileadmin/pixs/sotrudnichestvo/3d_map/south_stream_europe_big_eng_final.jpg. 
17 International Institute for Strategic Studies, “Nord Stream Moves Forward,” March 22, 2010, 
accessed June 2, 2012, http://climatesecurity.blogspot.com/2010/03/nord-stream-moves-forward.html. 
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In addition to that, on November 8, 2011, the first of the twin Nord Stream gas 
pipelines became operational, directly connecting Russia and Germany under the Baltic 
Sea and bypassing other intermediary transit states18 (Figure 2.) Once the second pipeline 
is complete, the overall transportation capacity is estimated to be about 55 billion cubic 
meters (bcm) of natural gas per year.19 
Moreover, at the beginning of December 2011, Russian Gazprom purchased, in 
addition to the 50 percent of Beltransgaz which it already owned, the remaining 50 
percent of shares of Belarus’s gas transportation system.20 From that moment, Russia 
entirely controls energy flow through Belarus’s territory. 
Currently, Ukraine still maintains its ownership over the gas transportations 
routes inherited from the Soviet Union. However, it is not clear yet whether Russia will 
be able to preserve its possession of these routes or will have to hand over control of the 
pipelines to Gazprom. With its economy vitally depending on natural gas, Ukraine, in the 
last quarter of 2011, paid the highest price for gas supplies from Russia among all 
European states, that is, more than $500 per thousand cubic meters.21 Gazprom is ready 
to lower the price for natural gas if Ukraine agrees that Gazprom and Naftogaz Ukraina, 
 the Ukrainian state-owned oil and gas company, would be unified.22  
Thus, the monopolization of gas transportation routes from Russia and Caspian 
Basin states to European countries, including major political players of the European 
Union, creates a precondition of Russia’s influence on economic and political decision 
making in countries with economies highly dependent on exports of mineral resources. 
                                                 
18 Nord Stream: The New Gas Supply Route for Europe, “Nord Stream Pipeline Inaugurated – Major 
Milestone for European Energy Security,” November 8, 2011, accessed December 10, 2011, 
http://www.nord-stream.com/press-info/press-releases/nord-stream-pipeline-inaugurated-major-milestone-
for-european-energy-security-388. 
19 Nord Stream: The New Gas Supply Route for Europe, “The Pipeline,” accessed December 10, 
2011. http://www.nord-stream.com/pipeline. 
20 “Белорусские газопроводы перешли под контроль “Газпрома” (“Belarus’s gas pipelines went 
under GAZPROM’s Control”), ИноТВ (InoTV, Russia), December 5, 2011, accessed December 10, 2011, 
http://inotv.rt.com/2011–12–05/Belorusskie-gazoprovodi-pereshli-pod-kontrol. 
21LB.ua/Economy, “Тигипко: цена российского газа для Украины составляет $500” (“Tigipko: 
The Price of Russian Natural Gas for Ukraine Is $500”), October 14, 2011, accessed December 11, 2011, 
http://economics.lb.ua/state/2011/10/14/119420_TSena_rossiyskogo_gaza_dlya_Ukrain.html. 
22 Maria Selivanova, “Дешевый газ для Украины в обмен на ‘трубу’” (“Cheap Gas for Ukraine in 
Exchange for ‘Pipe’”), RIANOVOSTI, August 02, 2011, http://ria.ru/analytics/20110802/410999263.html. 
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This looks feasible due to Russia’s geographical location and the amount of resources it 
holds and can use effectively as a tool of economic leverage to project Russia’s political 
aspirations to re-emerge as a world power.23 
B. SCOPE AND PURPOSE 
 The purpose of this thesis is to study how Russia’s tremendous energy potential 
impacts the shaping of Russia’s current foreign policy, particularly vis-à-vis the European 
Union and the European Union individual states that are getting heavily dependent on 
Russian energy supplies.  
 The scope of this study is to develop a notion that a consumer’s heavy 
dependence on a supplier’s energy resources may turn the latter into an economic tool of 
political coercion, to assess the European energy market and degree of its reliance on 
Russian energy supplies; to describe how the European countries might act, and what 
options they have, to enhance their energy security; and to envision how intensified 
energy cooperation throughout Asia might impact future European-Russian relations.  
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Tracing Russian persistence to monopolize control over the energy transportation 
routes supplying Europe, this thesis will answer the following research questions: 
Taking into account the growing demand for energy across Europe and, in 
particular, in the European Union, are Russia’s attempts to monopolize the European 
energy market just economically motivated or are they a way to accomplish Russia’s 
international political ambitions by using economic means as an instrument of state 
power? 
What are the challenges to implementation of the common energy security of the 
European Union, specifically with respect to Russian “energy foreign policy”?  
What could be done and what is being done by the European Union to enhance 
European energy security?   
                                                 
23 Alexander Ghaleb, “Natural Gas as an Instrument of Russian State Power” (Letort Paper, Strategic 
Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, PA, October 2011), v. 
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D. HYPOTHESIS 
During the Cold War, the Soviet Union used its strong military as a tool of the 
state’s power and invested significantly in the development of its defense sector of 
economy. The dissolution of the Soviet Union, followed by economic and political 
turbulence, left Russia without efficient military power and with a tumbled-down defense 
industry that are critically important to support its resurfaced superpower ambitions. This 
obstacle could be overcome by substituting military power with the economic one 
through domination as the leading energy supplier, in particular of natural gas. Thus, 
establishment of ultimate governmental control over the energy sector became a key 
element of the Russian domestic policy that would convert the energy resources into the 
instrument of the state’s power. 
After the dissolution of the USSR, all major energy transportation routes between 
Russian energy producers and European consumers turned out to be in possession of the 
newly independent states, the former Soviet republics, on which Russia became heavily 
dependent as energy transit intermediaries. To ensure consistency of the energy supply 
flow and to lessen Russia’s reliance on the transit states, and to maintain its reputation as 
a dependable energy supplier—an issue that has been raised after disruption of the gas 
flow to Europe back in 2006 and 2009—Russia is seeking ways to diversify energy 
transportation routes to Europe, namely through the North Stream and the South Stream 
projects. Such a policy of linking consumer and supplier directly is presumably motivated 
politically rather than economically. Russia is willing to pay a significantly higher cost 
for a complex construction of new pipelines that bypass intermediaries than the lower 
cost of investing in economically reasonable renovation of the existing transportation 
routes, in particular the one in Ukraine, through which 80 percent of Russian natural gas 
passes on its way to Europe. Acknowledging the asymmetric reliance on Russian energy 
supplies within the European Union, the establishment of Russian monopolistic control 
over flow of a critical amount of energy supplies to Europe might be converted into a 
regional political dominance. Threatening the possibility of abrupt energy disruption and 
price manipulation, Russia could demand political concessions from any individual state 
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that falls in its sphere of interest. In other words, economic leverage could become an 
efficient tool of state power to be effectively used to achieve political objectives. 
E. METHODOLOGY 
The main method of evaluation of the research questions is application of 
Constructivism and Realism theories to international relations that Russia pursues 
towards the post-Soviet space, the European Union, and individual European states.  
The Constructivist theory, while examining the historical, cultural, and political 
legacy left after the Soviet Union, explains the existence of Russia’s so-called traditional 
spheres of influence, mostly over post-Soviet space. The same approach could explain the 
existing aggressive attitude and destructive rhetoric by both the Russian political 
leadership and the civil society towards the Western world and its democratic values, 
namely, the United States, the European Union and NATO. They mostly stress the 
impermissibility of further westernization of the former Soviet republics by granting 
them European Union and NATO membership. 
The Realist theory helps explain how Russia uses its economic potential, 
specifically its leading role as a fossil fuels exporter, to turn it into an instrument of state 
power to support Russia’s reemerged superpower ambitions. Realist theory clarifies 
Russia’s concurrent domestic policy and assertive foreign behavior. Further, it helps to 
understand why Russia has regained state control over domestic energy-producing 
companies, limits participation of foreign investors in development of its hydrocarbon 
extraction fields, persistence in trying to gain access to the European energy market, and 
remains consistent in attempts to strengthen near-monopolistic control over energy 
transportation routes that connect Europe with Russia and Central Asia, especially over 
those in the former Soviet republics. 
F. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The book, Russian Energy Power and Foreign Relations: Implications for 
Conflict and Cooperation,24 contains chapters that help the reader understand the 
                                                 
24 Jeronim Perovic, Robert W. Orttung, and Andreas Wenger, eds., Russian Energy Power and 
Foreign Relations: Implications for Conflict and Cooperation (New York: Routledge Taylor & Francis 
Group, 2009). 
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importance of the relationship between security of energy demand and security of energy 
supply and its growing influence on the ways the states shape their foreign policies. The 
book gives insights into the role that Russia’s vast energy potential plays in domestic and 
international dimensions to support Russia’s reemerged “global ambitions”25. Among 
other points, the authors argue for existence of asymmetric energy interdependence 
between Russia and the European states, which are key Russian energy consumers, and 
share some ideas about how the European states might counter this steadily increasing 
reliance on Russian hydrocarbons.26 They also discuss possible implications for 
European energy security of recently intensified energy cooperation across Asia.27  
In his volume, The Oligarchs: Wealth and Power in the New Russia,28 David E. 
Hoffman describes the emergence of a unique Russian capitalism after the dissolution of 
the Soviet Union and the appearance of an oligarchy during the years of economic and 
political stagnation, shortages, and mass poverty. He argues that Russia’s failure to adopt 
free market economy sufficiently was due to long-term suppression of “private initiative 
and entrepreneurship”29 in the people’s minds by the Soviet regime. He also stresses the 
misbalanced development of market institutions and rules and free pricing on 
commodities and how it caused creation of such a massive and durable underground 
economy. Also, he analyzes interrelations between the political leadership and the 
oligarchy in the 1990s in the state without “rule of law.” He states that political decisions 
in Russia were highly influenced by the oligarchy, which was seeking only to maximize 
their profits, causing a deepening of overall corruption throughout the country. 
In his book, Petrostate: Putin, Power, and The New Russia,30 Marshall I. 
Goldman portrays Russia as a reemerging energy superpower as more countries 
worldwide, including leading economies in Europe, became consumers of Russian 
                                                 
25 Ibid., 9. 
26 Ibid., 89–108. 
27 Ibid., 132–154, 201–222. 
28 David E. Hoffman, The Oligarchs: Wealth and Power in the New Russia (New York: Public 
Affairs, 2002). 
29 Ibid., 6. 
30 Goldman, Petrostate. 
 11
natural resources and how that status impacts as a re-emerging energy superpower 
impacts the characteristics of Russia’s political diplomacy.. He describes the process of 
how the government regained control of natural resources through using the state’s 
legitimate institutions to suppress the domestic oligarchy. He also stresses European 
vulnerability to sudden natural gas cut-offs, as happened after a dispute between Russia 
and Ukraine in 2006. He also argues that Russia derives political power from the new 
economic empire it is building with its natural gas pipelines. The author warns Europe of 
the necessity to seek diversification of energy supplies to reduce its economic 
dependence on just one source of energy.   
In his study “Natural Gas as an Instrument of Russian State Power,”31 Alexander 
Ghaleb argues that “Russian control of the natural gas supplies and of the export 
infrastructure system of natural gas to Europe gives tremendous leverage to Russia in 
imposing its national security policy.”32 He supports his argument by the fact that leading 
world economies increase consumption of natural gas for “environmental, economic, 
technological, and . . . geostrategic considerations.”33 Furthermore, he reasonably 
presumes that natural gas could be an effective tool of state power34 and could be used as 
a means of political coercion in imposing unilateral sanctions throughout East and 
Central Europe35. For that reason, monopolized control over natural gas pipelines 
becomes a key of Russian foreign policy36. In addition to that, Ghaleb suggests that 
European dependence on Russian natural gas would lead to “political disunity” within the 
European Union.37 
 
                                                 
31 Ghaleb, “Natural Gas.” 
32 Ibid., ix. 
33 Ibid., 10. 
34 Ibid., 12. 
35 Ibid., 15. 
36 Ibid., 57. 
37 Ibid., 111. 
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G. ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY 
The next chapter, Chapter II, will depict how Russia organizes its foreign policy 
by seeking ways to dominate in the international dimension, how its domestic and foreign 
policies are integrated, and what means and capabilities it holds to pursue such an 
aspiration. Chapter III of the study will give some insights into how possession of energy 
resources may be reflected in Russia’s foreign policy vis-à-vis the European Union with 
regard to the existing asymmetric interdependence between Russia and the European 
Union states and their heavy reliance on Russian energy resources, particularly natural 
gas. Chapter IV will describe what complicates the European Union energy policy and 
what the European Union is doing to overcome concurrent obstacles to enhance its 
energy security. Chapter V will summarize subjects described in the study. 
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II.  WHY RUSSIA SEEKS SUPREMACY 
I would assert that Russia’s contemporary foreign energy policy falls within a 
framework of political realism and neorealism. According to Robert Keohane, political 
realism contains three major assumptions that define the world’s politics: “(1) states . . . 
are the key units of actions; (2) they seek power, either as an end in itself or as a means to 
other ends; and (3) they behave in ways that are . . . rational.”38 In other words, states’ 
behavior is stipulated by the “language of power and interests”39. Another contemporary 
scholar, Hans Joachim Morgenthau, views political realism as the interaction of the 
“concepts of power, rationality and balance of power” and the key notions driving 
international politics. He argues that states struggle for power mostly due to the “human 
nature,” which has not changed since ancient history.40 Human beings are continuously in 
a state of war with each other or in fear of being so. He maintains the idea that states, to 
act effectively “in world politics,” should involve power. Thus, the more powerful a state 
is, the more ambitious its goals are. Further, he states that states seek rational ways to 
preserve suitable international policies, meaning that they are “consistent [and] . . . 
calculate costs and benefits of all alternative policies in order to maximize their utility in 
light both of those preferences and of their perceptions of the nature of reality.” Finally, 
Morgenthau sees the balance of power concept as a “necessary outgrowth” of power 
politics and being universally applicable.41 A more detailed and coherent explanation of 
the balance of power concept was developed by neorealism theorist Kenneth Waltz. He 
puts forward that the balance of power concept is valid for an “anarchic realm,” which 
the world is, in which entities “have to worry about their survival.” Further, Waltz insists 
that both internal and external means are important for the states’ self-preservation and 
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their achievements of foreign policy objectives.42 In other words, a state’s foreign policy 
and its domestic policy are closely interconnected; and to foresee its behavior in 
international politics, the domestic political structure and policy should be defined and 
described.43 Hence, in order to understand Russia’s behavior, it is necessary to gain some 
insights into its domestic policy and society and its economic development and to assess 
what could serve as instruments of its state power. 
A. SOCIO-POLITICAL DIMENSION 
On the international scene and domestically, Russia poses itself as a democratic 
state.44 I would disagree with that, assuming that a unique trait of so-called “directed 
democracy,” introduced by Russian leadership during Vladimir Putin’s first presidency, 
does not match the commonly accepted meaning of democracy. Classical democracy 
rests on three main pillars: participation of the population in political life; competition of 
political leaders for public votes; and accountability of the elected to their constituencies. 
Further, to be considered democratic, states should meet the following minimum 
requirements that would allow democracies to be what they are: freedom to form and join 
organizations, freedom of expression, the right to vote, eligibility for public office, the 
right of political leaders to compete for support and votes, alternative sources of 
information, free and fair elections, and institutions for making government policies 
depend on votes and other expressions of preferences.45 Indeed, Russia has a variety of 
political parties, regularly held elections, and diverse media sources and allows regular 
people to participate in political life, etc. But, as Ivan Krastev insists, the Russian version 
of implementation of the existing democratic “institutional elements” helps not only 
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“those in power to stay in power” but to “monopolize competition for it [power],” 
resulting in “a near total monopoly of power.”46  
The Russian brand of “democracy without representation” is unique. To build a 
regime that would resemble a democratic one but not being democratic by nature, Russia 
introduced an innovative mechanism known as political technology. The aim of the 
political technology is to manipulate formally existing democratic institutions to achieve 
political outcomes which had been already pre-planned by the ruling elite. In other 
words, political technologists pursue interests of those in power by creating an illusion of 
competition. The final goal of the “managed democracy” trend is to avoid any 
accountability of the political leadership to their constituencies. As Krastev stated, 
“Managed democracy is a political regime that liberates the elites from necessity of 
factual governing of the state and gives them time to take care of their personal 
business.”47 
The way the population participates in the political life is quite remarkable. 
People do take part in it by expressing their will during elections and public meetings or, 
even occasionally, they are invited to be a part of a local government.48 Within the 
concept of directed democracy, the goal of the political technologist is to let people 
participate but without any real impact on those who govern the state.49 That is only 
possible by creating an apolitical and stable middle class,50 which actually is a major 
motivating force of potential domestic political changes, or by allowing regular people to 
do a meaningless representative job without real influence on “government decision 
making.”51 
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The middle class in Russia is not independent. A majority of it is employed by the 
governmental or state-owed institutions. The share of those who are not dependent on 
wages paid by the government is not significant. Only around 25 percent of the entire 
Russian population is employed by middle and small-sized businesses. Such a mass of 
governmental employment preconditions corporate thinking and solidarity. The 
government employees either have to support the political leadership or avoid criticizing 
ruling politicians. Not doing so could be risky in terms of loss of jobs because, in private 
business, opportunities for making life better off are fewer. Thus, by having in its employ 
as many people as possible, the government maintains a stable and apolitical society.52 
Public activities are not discouraged by the state unless they threaten the stability 
of the political regime. People may easily gather for peaceful demonstrations to support 
opinions that have been already supported by the government. Also, some prominent 
activists may get a seat of local or federal significance in legislative or executive 
branches. But those jobs are worthless, only aiming to show publicly that democracy de 
jure works but, de facto, are without meaningful representation. That is the way the state 
seeks to maintain control over public involvement in political activity in order to predict 
any political changes the public may trigger. For the time being, “none of the reforms 
implemented in Russia . . . was initiated by pressure from below.”53  That statement 
testifies to the denial by the government of actual public political needs and/or for the 
need for a non-politicized majority of the population.  
In competition among political leaders for public votes during the election 
process, the media’s role is acknowledged. In Russia, the most influential media sources, 
specifically the most popular TV channels, are controlled by the government. TV is used 
by the political technologists to shape the population’s sense that there are no alternatives 
to the existing wise leaders who care about every single citizen. News broadcast on TV is 
mostly the same throughout the media; programs are mainly pre-recorded to minimize the 
risk of the outflow of undesirable information so that diverse ideological opinions are not 
presented. To avoid interference by other unwelcomed TV channels, control over the 
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broadcasting network is also monopolized by the state through the NTV Company just as 
transportation of hydrocarbons is controlled by Gazprom and Sibneft.54 At the same time, 
to show the existence of media diversity, Russia preserves some room for truly 
independent media channels, but their influence on public opinion is minor as a result of 
the monopoly on the main media sources of information.  
Special attention is paid to how elections are managed to gain a desired outcome. 
First, personal accountability of the elected to their constituencies has been eliminated. 
The pattern of “single-member-district” elections (representation of a district’s voters by 
their nominee) to Parliament (State Duma) was replaced by “closed-party-list” elections 
(Duma members are appointed by a political party in proportion to how many votes the 
party gained during the elections). In other words, formal accountability is preserved, but, 
in fact, no one is personally accountable for anything specific. Second, government 
excessively involves itself into the election process. More precisely, it is unlawful to 
sponsor the political campaigns of opposing political parties. Government preserves its 
right to fund and supervise “campaign-related expenditures.” Such a dependency on 
expenditure of governmental money literally nullifies the significance of parties as 
political bodies. Third, the government unreasonably injects law into the political 
process. In democracies, government and society establish a set of rules that check each 
other’s behavior (“rule of law”). In Russia, rulers control society by means of legislation 
that necessitates “severe punishment” for violators of any kind. The punishment could 
entail even banning a candidate from participation in the elections. Fourth, a new set of 
requirements were introduced for a political party to be elected to the Duma. The 
threshold was raised and parties were forbidden to create coalitions and blocs. Further, 
the minimum number of collected signatures required for a political party to get onto the 
ballot has been increased. Also, there is no minimum number of voters required to come 
to the polls for elections to be valid. Moreover, constituents are deprived of an 
opportunity to oppose all proposed candidates by voting “against all.” The old norm was 
that the elections would not have been valid if the number of “against all” pins (votes) 
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exceeded the number of supporters of the leading candidate. Finally, the Russian 
government introduced some “nonstandard” voting procedures, allowing people to vote 
at home or in advance. The government justified the new procedures by the necessity of 
maximizing the number of voters to be involved in political activity. In fact, those 
changes inspire the possibility of fraudulent results by the way that the bulletins could be 
“filled correctly.”55 
B. ECONOMY 
The reason Russian political leadership was able to concentrate and maintain 
centralized power and managed to find massive public support for its domestic and 
international policy at the beginning of the 2000s is found in Russia’s rapid economic 
growth and recovery after the chaos and turmoil of the 1990s. An overall opinion is that 
that became possible because of the appearance of a new generation of political leaders 
who are open-minded and free of the Soviet mentality.  
One of the important independent variables that drive contemporary Russian 
foreign policy is Russia’s current economic arrangements. Russian economy is export-
oriented. Eighty-five percent of its state revenue comes from exporting raw materials 
such as oil, natural gas, timber, and metals. Russia possesses about 30 percent of the 
world’s proved natural gas reserves and 6 percent of its oil. Russia’s main fossil-
resources consumers are the former Soviet states and the high-paying European Union 
countries. Because it inherited developed oil and natural gas pipeline systems from the 
Soviet Union, Russia did not have to invest in construction of new energy transportation 
routes. At the beginning of the 2000s, Russia managed to meet its budget needs quickly, 
mainly due to significant reduction of domestic energy production across Europe because 
of Europe’s dwindling hydrocarbon resources and rapidly growing energy demand. Being 
years behind technologically and having to meet growing public needs, since 2000 Russia 
has imported a variety goods of higher quality than are produced domestically, failing, at 
the same time, to develop its own technology or to successfully import technologies from 
other developed countries. 
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Further, all major sources of the state’s revenue are under the state’s control. 
Before the Putin era, all major businesses were in the hands of so-called oligarchs. In 
private hands, the energy sector did not give much support to the economic growth. Once 
Putin was in power, all key energy companies, which are now accountable for about 50 
percent of the budget’s income, were literally confiscated (Yukos and Transib) through 
selective application of legislation and placed under governmental control and ownership 
(Gazprom and Sibneft). That move prevented the domestic energy market from further 
liberalization and development. Continuously imposed bureaucratic restrictions resulted 
in lack of incentives for domestic and foreign companies to invest. Moreover, Russia 
consistently does not allow foreign investors to come to capitalize Russia’s energy 
sector.56 At the same time, Russia not only does not invest in developing untapped 
hydrocarbon fields,57 but also lacks sophisticated technologies to develop new fields 
efficiently itself. Unlike in other developed economies, energy extraction, transportation, 
and distribution to consumers are monopolized and controlled by the state through state-
owned companies. Those monopolies eliminate competiveness in the domestic energy 
market. In the international energy market, energy demand would be secured to the 
highest possible extent, and the amount of revenue collected would be high. If the 
extraction, transportation, and distribution segments of the Russian energy industry were 
to be separated as the Energy Charter stipulates,58 Russia would have to give up its 
almost monopolistic control over the transit routes by making the energy market open, 
transparent, and competitive.59 That may make Russia vulnerable to energy prices 
fluctuations and sensitive to diversification options of its main international consumers, 
with further direct impact on Russia’s revenue collection. 
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Hence, I would argue that Russia pretty much fits the criteria of being a “rentier 
state” since its economy is heavily dependent on the rent of natural resources, only a 
small proportion of the population works in companies accountable for rent generation, 
and the government is the major recipient of the income that comes from the rent.60  
Political and economic dimensions in Russia are interlocked. During Putin’s first 
presidency, the state regained control over major “extractive industries,” and those 
persons in close affiliation with Putin were appointed to run those business holdings and 
corporations.61 Russian elites and Putin’s inner circle became those whom he used to 
work with at his time in the KGB and Saint Petersburg city administration. In other 
words, those who were appointed to high governmental and business positions were those 
whom he had known before and who shared the same set of values and ideas that had 
been shaped during the Soviet times or by the Soviet ideology of dictatorship. The most 
vivid case of such an intertwined political-economic relationship is a former Russian 
president, Medvedev. He used to work with Putin in the Saint Petersburg administration. 
Not so long ago, he was in charge of the state-owned company, Gazprom (the natural gas 
monopolist controlling extraction, transportation, and distribution of hydrocarbons to 
consumers), in which his younger brother currently is a vice-president. In that way, such 
a business-political corporation has to observe the highest level of “obedience” and 
loyalty to the top political leadership. 
C. THE RUSSIAN MILITARY  
As realist theory stipulates, “the reality of domination—certain states over others, 
and of the elites over nonelites—continues.”62 In this respect, Waltz in his balance of 
power theory, predicts that in an “anarchic realm . . . states seek power and calculate their 
interests in terms power.”63 According to Morgenthau, to maximize their power, states 
would seek ways to influence other states in terms of power “and resources that can be 
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used to exercise influence.” Waltz argues that in “a distribution of power system” all 
states, depending on their size and available power resources, will act differently with 
regard to change “in power relationship” by establishing or joining coalitions.64 In this 
respect, means of power is an important variable for pursuing a state’s interest or 
projecting its power. The classical means-of-power projection is a state’s military.  
In “Russia’s National Security Strategy to 2020,” Russia does acknowledge 
appearance of new threats to its national security: terrorist activity and wars on its 
territory; conflicts with and in adjacent states, specifically in South Caucasus and 
Afghanistan; global proliferation of nuclear arms [or threats] and means of their delivery. 
However, the “Security Strategy” does not prioritize them. As it was addressed by Putin 
back in 2004, all of those activities were explained by “perceived weakness” of Russia’s 
“strategic strength.” Hence, Russian leadership still heavily relies on its existing nuclear 
arsenal as its main “security strategy.”65 As the Security Strategy states, “The strategic 
goals related to improving national defense consist of preventing global and regional 
wars and conflicts, and likewise of realizing strategic deterrence in the interests of 
ensuring the country’s military security.”66 Thus, the existing Russian nuclear-arsenal-
utilization concept falls into the framework of rational nuclear deterrence theory that 
suggests that due to possible “catastrophic outcomes of nuclear exchange . . . the 
probability of major war among states having nuclear weapons approaches zero.”67 In 
this respect, Russia does not anticipate being invaded militarily by major world powers 
and poses itself as a powerful state in possession of an effective means of deterrence. 
Soon after the accession into his presidency, Vladimir Putin had his image created 
as a nation’s “father” pursuing the goal of Russia’s reemergence as a superpower, not 
allowing others to push Russia around.68 Rapid economic growth (mainly thanks to 
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increased demand for energy resources), a successful fight against oligarchs, increased 
spending on social welfare programs, and decisive actions against terrorists in Chechnya 
gave him much credibility as a real national leader domestically and an “image as a 
strong man.”69 However, aspirations of being a superpower cannot be fulfilled without a 
strong military. In fact, the current status of the Russian military is deplorable. It takes 
time, money, consistency, and continuity to reform the military successfully. At this time, 
the only remaining component that gives the Russian military strength is Russia’s 
existing nuclear potential, which was actually inherited from the former Soviet Union. 
Putin also took advantage of it and presented himself, especially for foreign counterparts, 
as a commander-in-chief of nuclear strike forces, spending overnight on board of nuclear 
ballistic submarine and taking a flight on a strategic bomber.70 
The image that everything, in domestic and foreign dimensions, is decided by one 
person correlates with tenets of an authoritarian method of state government. As Waltz 
suggests, in developing countries with unstable governments, nuclear possession 
engenders fear that, to ensure sufficient control over nuclear weapons to prevent 
unauthorized launch, such states are prone to be authoritarian with an enhanced level of 
“internal struggle for power.”71 
Another scholar, Scott Sagan, reasonably argues that non-democratic nuclear 
powers “have either military-run governments or weak civilian-led governments in which 
professional military have a strong and direct influence on policymaking.”72 In Russia, 
government is de jure civilian. De facto, representation by former military cadre (or cadre 
from the militarized security services) dominates. Putin himself is a former KGB officer, 
and he prefers to surround himself with former KGB and representatives of other force 
structures who are loyal to him. For instance, the recently appointed head of the 
Presidential apparatus, Ivanov, who is the former Minister of Defense and, most recently, 
vice-prime-minister, is also a retired KGB general. Thus, current political leadership, 
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consisting mostly of former siloviki, helped Putin to build a strong power vertical, in 
which the political decision making is handled by one person. 
Domestic stability is critically correlated with possible external threats. To 
strengthen civil-military relations and to gain public support by the leadership, an image 
of external threat is highly important. “Russia’s National Security Strategy to 2020” 
defines the United States and NATO (indirectly but with no doubts) as major threats to 
Russia’s national security. The “Security Strategy” accepts the notion that “military force 
is a usable tool of foreign policy” and at the same time acknowledges the weakness and 
inability of Russian conventional military forces to compete effectively with NATO and 
China.73 Thus, nuclear superpower status is the only meaningful way to maintain military 
parity with other leading, nuclear-capable nations with regard to the “nuclear deterrence 
concept.” Domestically, possession of the nuclear arsenal makes Russian leadership 
strong in the eyes of its own citizens; it is what Russian citizens see as giving Russia the 
status of a great power and is widely supported by the population. Thus, Russia’s nuclear 
capability closely links foreign and domestic politics.74 Moreover, Russian elites strongly 
back an idea that “Russia’s natural role in the international system is of a major power.”75 
Therefore, a major power could only be opposed by other major powers, which are 
mostly those in possession of nuclear arms. That is why any attempt by NATO to expand 
eastward calls for a negative reaction by the Russian leadership, which considers such 
expansion as an attempt to undermine Russia’s great capability.76 Strong opposition to an 
increase in NATO’s membership was publically expressed during the NATO summit in 
Bucharest, Romania, in April 2008. In his conversation with the United States President, 
G. W. Bush, Putin viciously criticized Ukraine and Georgia for their foreign policy 
strategy of getting a NATO Membership Action Plan (MAP). Putin even went beyond the 
norms of diplomacy, stating that Ukraine “even is not a state.”77  
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Besides positioning himself as commander-in-chief of nuclear arms, Putin 
“regards himself as an expert in foreign affairs”78 for the reason that he is the nation’s 
first leader since Lenin who stayed overseas on long-lasting residency. As a former KGB 
officer, his mindset has been greatly influenced by the Soviet system and the Cold War 
rhetoric. In the Soviet Union, the “military tended to exaggerate the western threat” while 
diplomats provided the Soviet leadership with more realistic threat assessments.79 Hence, 
Putin presumably preserves a tenet of a “single-handed” decision making in “national 
security policy”80 and still relies on information provided by the SVR (External 
Intelligence Service) or GRU (Main Intelligence Directorate) of the General Staff81 as 
being the “worst-case scenarios” rather than relying on more realistic data provided by 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.8283. 
One of the prominent recent examples of how Russian political leadership seeks 
public support for its ongoing foreign policy in order to consolidate the population in 
front of an external enemy is the current hysteria about development of the United States’ 
anti-ballistic missile defense system (BMD) in Europe. That system has actually been 
designed against possible hostilities from Iran, which might be running a nuclear program 
of its own to development nuclear weapons. In addition to Russia’s traditional concerns 
about “strategic depth” thinking and therefore sensitivity to any military facilities in its 
neighborhood that can undermine, even hypothetically, its military power,84 Russian 
leadership through media sources proclaims that the United States still maintains hostile 
intentions towards Russia to weaken Russia’s national security. For example, during the 
European Union Summit in May 2009, the former Russian president, Dmitry Medvedev, 
declared that “the European Union’s Eastern Partnership” (countries without either the 
EU or NATO membership) has been established to oppose Moscow’s policy since the 
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post-communist East European nations consistently promote anti-Russian policies.”85 
Furthermore, December 2007 polling showed that nearly half of the Russian population 
backs a notion that “the purpose of American foreign policy is the complete destruction 
of Russia.”86 It looks as though everyone who still remembers the Soviet Union is 
preoccupied by negative reaction to whatever represents Western society.87 Furthermore, 
to a high degree, “Soviet and then Russian policy-making . . . has been characterized by 
deception and intrigue.”88 For that reason, the harder the United States argues that the 
intention of the anti-ballistic missile defense system is harmless for Russia, the more 
distrustful the Russian reaction is. Thus, whatever the United States would do to promote 
national or collective security, it inevitably will generate negative reaction from Russian 
political leadership, who will represent it as undermining Russia’s national security. 
As a response to the United States’ intentions to deploy a counterargument of the 
BMD development, the former Russian president, Dmitry Medvedev, declared intentions 
to the deploy tactical nuclear missile system Iskander in the Kaliningrad district, targeting 
BMD launching sites in Poland.89 Such a declaration by the Russian president met with 
public support and high expectations but was no more than just muscling in front of the 
rest of the world. Even if those Iskander missiles would have been deployed, militarily it 
makes no sense. Once American interceptor missiles are launched, “it would be too late 
to use [the Iskanders].” Pre-emptive launch of Iskander missiles, as Medvedev asserted, 
would inevitably result a military clash with nuclear-armed NATO states per Article V of 
NATO Agreement.90 
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D. ENERGY AS A SUBSTITUTION FOR MILITARY POWER  
Even though Russian political leadership managed to consolidate population 
behind current Russian foreign policy, Russia is unlikely to fulfill its global aspirations 
using its conventional military as the means of power projection; the Russian military has 
been in decline over the last two decades since the dismantling of the USSR.91 A nuclear 
arsenal is not the means of advancing national interests overseas, either, since the most 
effective way it could be used is for military deterrence in order to maintain status quo 
with other military superpowers. To support the notion of political realists that foreign 
policy effectiveness depends on the degree of power involvement,92 an effective 
substitution for military power projection could be found in manipulating “energy 
supplies” that “not only could have important financial repercussions but could also be a 
powerful political tool.”93 
If Russia’s conventional military can be used to project its power and support its 
national interests abroad in nearby regions, as was witnessed in 2008 during the Russia-
Georgia conflict, then its enormous natural resources, existing developed transportation 
pipeline system, and geographical location give Russia a natural advantage. Russia could 
use those resources as “a powerful political and economic weapon”94 to extend Russia’s 
interests beyond the post-Soviet space,95 especially vis-à-vis Europe, which currently is 
the largest high-paying exporter of Russian hydrocarbons, especially natural gas.96 
Europe has no or very few alternatives for exporters other than Russia, which makes it 
difficult for Europe to avoid dependence on Russia as a single energy supplier. That 
situation gives advantage to Russia with regard to price manipulation. Those states “that 
are considered . . . friendly to the Kremlin” may “enjoy lower prices than others.”97 
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Furthermore, energy supply flow could be disrupted for many reasons, which would 
cause severe damage to consumers’ economies and undermine political stability in those 
states, as happened during the Russia-Ukraine gas crisis in the winter of 2009.98 Thus, 
with regard to the European Union states, “western leaders would have to think twice 
before resisting the political demands of the supplier.”99 
The idea of restoring Russia’s regional political dominance by economic means, 
“in particular its mineral resources,” rather than by military means stems from the 
mindset of the current political leadership. In his dissertation, which predates Putin’s 
presidency, Vladimir Putin stated the necessity of reasserting the state’s control over 
natural resources that became controlled by private owners in the 1990s so that they can 
be used “to advance the country’s national interests.” Further, he specified that “the state 
has the right to regulate the process of their development and use.” At the time, Putin 
acknowledged weaknesses of the Russian economy with respect to its potential for 
competiveness. Indeed, the Russian economy was too isolated for years from other 
developed foreign markets to be able to quickly catch up technologically and compete 
effectively. Even though foreign investors were welcomed, Putin was assertive that the 
government must “retain operating control. . . . He insisted that it is a mistake to relay on 
private owners and markets alone,” referring to the economic chaos of the 1990s, which 
coincided with privatization. Thus, to “emerge from its deep crisis and restore its former 
might,” Russia should maintain governmental control over major companies and 
corporations, especially those that are “resource-based.”100 Morgenthau argues that 
“statesmen think and act in terms of interest defined as power.” To pursue its “objective 
national interests”101 in seeking power and power projection, Russia must make quick 
and effective use of the vast amount of energy resources it possesses rather than going 
through time- and capital-intensive militarization.  
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E. CONCLUSION 
Russia’s foreign policy follows a pattern of political realism, which assumes that 
the world is anarchic and states’ behaviors are driven by their national interests with 
respect to existing capabilities and the necessity of using power to achieve their goals and 
objectives. To act rationally, Russian political leadership, when conducting its foreign 
policy, capitalizes on Russia’s gigantic energy resources rather than on capital-intensive 
modernization of its military, a classic instrument of power. Used strategically and 
intelligently, energy supplies could effectively be substituted for conventional weapons 
with respect to projecting Russian influence. The unique domestic political notion of so-
called “directed democracy” was introduced by the Russian elites and guided by Vladimir 
Putin. It, along with everything else, helped to legitimize the use of energy as a weapon 
in the public’s view but without factual public influence. This concept allowed the 
building of a domestic hierarchical order which ensured the state’s control over all 
existing strategic resources and capabilities necessary for influence abroad and legitimize 
public support for domestic and foreign policy without the government’s real 
consideration of the public will. To strengthen its domestic power and consolidate the 
society, the Russian leadership keeps exploiting the United States and NATO as the 
image of aggressive enemies, as has been affirmed in “Russia’s “National Security 






III.  THE EUROPEAN UNION ENERGY SECURITY 
CHALLENGES VERSUS RUSSIAN ENERGY POLICY 
As Czech Deputy Prime Minister Alexandr Vondra claimed back in October 
2007, “Unjust manipulation or interruption of energy supplies is as much security threat 
as is military action.”102 If energy flow is disrupted, it severely affects the economy of a 
consumer state without actual physical destruction of its infrastructure and economic 
assets and provokes “political instability” in domestic and regional external 
dimensions.103 Internally, it weakens social-political relations in the affected country and 
may lead to a “humanitarian crisis,” as was witnessed in Southeastern Europe during the 
Russia-Ukrainian gas dispute in 2009 when Europeans had to deal with a severe shortage 
of energy supplies.104 Regionally, manipulation by energy cut-offs is often seen through 
the prism of international policy making, especially by rentier states; they feel can 
develop their political agenda by influencing the energy security policy and strategy of 
their consumers and by then enforcing “asymmetric power relationships” between energy 
exporter and importer. In other words, as long as energy and foreign policies are closely 
interconnected in the contemporary security environment, energy producers seek 
“political dominance over a region” by using economic potential as a means of political 
leverage.105  
Such application of economic leverage subjugated to political objectives may 
follow a period of implemented economic sanctions. Alexander Ghaleb referred to Steve 
Chan, who defined economic sanctions as “the actual or threatened withdrawal of 
economic resources to affect a policy change by the target.” Further, Ghaleb supplements 
that definition by the statement made by Ivan Eland, who argues that economic sanctions 
aim “to have the maximum political effect through introducing psychological pressure 
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against its [a nation’s] political leaders and populace.”106 Indeed, economic sanctions in 
forms of embargos are widely used to achieve certain political ends and “promote foreign 
policy objectives.”107 The most recent example of deployment of economic sanctions is 
against Iran aiming to “discourage the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction”108 
due to the ambiguity of Iran’s nuclear program. As was addressed by the National 
Conference of Catholic Bishops, “sanctions can offer a nonmilitary alternative to the 
terrible options of war”109 and “can be a powerful and deadly form of intervention.”110  
Sanctions vary in scope but are not always politically and economically viable. 
Implementation of sanctions also burdens the economies of the imposing states due to 
inevitable reduction of the imposing states’ collected revenues111 and, for the most, 
requires a set of reasonable political goals with feasible political benefits to justify that 
possible economic loss. Sanctions can be multilateral or unilateral. Multilateral sanctions 
require unity of action of the coalition and cohesion of the sanctions’ deployment by all 
participating state actors. The states should have common “benefits of imposing 
economic sanctions,” share political will vis-à-vis a targeted state, and have relatively 
equal economic capabilities to bear the sanctioning. Mostly, multilateral efforts to 
sanction fail, not because of inefficiency of sanctions as a tool per se, but for the reason 
that the sanction-imposing actors often have different outlooks on the political outcomes 
of the sanctions and dissimilar economic abilities to bear and enforce sanctions strongly 
enough to achieve the desired end state.112 
Unlike multilateral sanctions, unilateral sanctions are more successful because 
their application does not face the difficulties the multilateral approach encounters. 
Unilateral sanctions do not require any sort of coordination with other sanctions 
enforcers. In other words, the necessity of reliance on partners in terms of their 
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participation and political support stops being an issue; the ratio between political 
benefits versus possible economic loss is calculated by a single actor with reference to its 
economic and political ability to afford the sanctions. In this respect, “the monopoly or 
near monopoly of a critical energy supply” creates a necessary precondition “for 
imposing unilateral sanctions.”113 
To develop this argument, I would support an argument made by Alexander 
Ghaleb that Russia is very capable of imposing unilateral economic sanctions. In other 
words, Russia’s possession of vast amounts of energy supplies, specifically natural gas 
can be rendered a tool of economic coercion vis-à-vis the European Union states by 
means of manipulation of the flow of energy to the European consumers.114 To support 
that argument, this chapter will further provide some insights on historical background of 
energy cooperation between Russia and Europe, vulnerability of the European natural gas 
market, and the current level of energy interdependence between Russia as supplier and 
Europe as consumer. 
A. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF RUSSIA-EUROPE ENERGY 
COOPERATION 
Energy cooperation between Western Europe and Russia dates back to the Soviet 
times and started in the late 1950s with construction of oil and natural gas pipelines 
connecting the Soviet Union energy fields with “the East European member states of the 
Council for Mutual Economic Assistance” and of the Warsaw Pact, namely “Poland, East 
Germany, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria.” In the late 1960s, seeking 
diversification options “away from oil into other forms of energy, notably natural gas,” 
and to reduce dependency on energy supplies originating in the Middle East, Western 
European countries initiated a round of negotiations with the Soviet Union on 
construction of natural gas pipelines to connect Russia and West Europe for natural gas 
delivery. Negotiations ended up with 20-year bilateral contracts between the Soviet 
Union as a supplier and Austria, West Germany, and France as consumers. After the fall 
of the Iranian monarchy in 1979, West European states, deeply concerned about their 
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energy security, looked at the Soviet Union as a major alternative source of energy for 
their growing and thus increasingly energy-demanding economies. Even though energy 
cooperation with West Europe was highly beneficial for the Soviet economy—increased 
trade with the West European market accounted for more than 60 percent of the Soviet 
budget income—the Soviet planned economy could not afford modernization of the 
transportation infrastructure to meet the gradual growth of West European demands for 
energy. Construction of new gas pipelines physically connecting Russian natural gas 
extraction fields and West European consumers appeared to be a capital-intense project 
and a burden for the Soviet planned economy. Only direct investments into the project 
and essential equipment delivery by the concerned West European states made the energy 
routes construction feasible.115116  
Through the end of the Cold War, the share of Russian natural gas in German, 
Italian and French energy markets rose from 15 to 36 percent.117 After the dismantling of 
the Soviet Union, Russia was still capable of meeting its hydrocarbons supply 
commitments to 14 existing European consumers mainly because of a substantial decline 
in domestic demand that resulted from the decline of industrial production. Nine of 
Russia’s 14 European customers even enjoyed increased volumes of mineral supplies 
downstreamed from Russia. Additionally, Russia set up energy cooperation with another 
European state, namely, Greece.118  
Over time, different European states came up with different levels of energy 
cooperation and dependency on hydrocarbons of Russian origin. The European Union as 
a whole, as of 2009, drew 36 percent of its imported natural gas from Russia,119 which 
was around 25 percent of the total European Union consumption.120 In reference to the 
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European Union states individually, some import 100 percent of their natural gas from 
Russia to meet their domestic needs; some are more than 50 percent dependent on 
Russian natural gas; some take none of it.121 Since the creation of the European Union as 
a multilateral institution, the “dynamic of European-Russian energy relations”122 has 
changed. Although the European Union aims to put forward an integrated approach 
toward a common security strategy for all European Union members, the existing diverse 
reliance of individual European Union states on energy imported from Russia 
substantially undermines such a joint effort; domestic energy security is mostly a subject 
to be dealt with by every state individually.123 That would inevitably reflect on how their 
foreign policies would be shaped vis-à-vis both the European Union and Russia. Thus, 
the current status of energy cooperation between the European Union states, the 
European Union, and Russia is equivocal. On the one hand, Russia has long-term 
contracts for providing natural gas supplies with each European state individually. On the 
other hand, the European Union-Russia energy cooperation is grounded in interaction 
between the European Union states as a unified body and Russia as a key energy supplier.  
In this respect, I would argue that historically formed energy ties with European 
states and the current dynamics of energy relations between Russia and Europe give 
Russia political advantage over Europe based on the hypothetical use of energy supplies 
as an economic weapon to advance Russia’s political objectives. That stems from the 
notion that the European Union states, lacking a common energy policy, might disagree 
on the shape of the foreign toward Russia: Russia is a supplier of a critical amount of an 
energy source for the European Union states, is a holder of a vast amount of that 
resource, and enjoys state’s control over it; thus, Russia would not face the “problems of 
a multilateral coalition.”124. 
B. EUROPEAN NATURAL GAS MARKET  
To cover their domestic needs, the European states acquire natural gas supplies 
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from a variety of sources. Europe produces natural gas domestically (mainly extracted by 
the UK, the Netherlands, and Norway) and imports it from other regions, namely, from 
Northern Africa (Egypt, Libya, Algeria), the Middle East, and, in large part, Russia 125 
(Figure 3). Europe imports of total 36 percent of its natural gas needs from Russia126 
through pipelines while imports in the form of liquefied natural gas (LNG) come from 
Africa and the Middle East and account for about 15 percent127 (Figure 4). Domestic 
production of natural gas by the European Union states is currently in decline. Even 
though the major European Union gas producers still extract a significant amount of 
energy,128 they are unlikely to satisfy the steadily growing European demand for natural 
gas.129 The combined annual European production of natural gas, including from non-EU 
members, slightly exceeded 300 bcm130 in 2010 whereas its consumption rose to 522 
bcm.131 
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Figure 3.   Gas Pipeline Projects throughout Europe132  
 
Figure 4.   Eurasian Gas Transportation System133  
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Even with an increase of 26.5 percent in the LNG trade in 2010 as compared to 
2009 with total imports of 65 million metric tons (mmt) of natural gas,134 Europe is still 
unlikely to be able to satisfy its steadily increasing demand for natural gas by relying 
only on the LNG diversification because of the high costs involved in construction of 
LNG terminals and the economic unviability for the landlocked countries.135 In the 
meantime, Russia is capable of meeting growing European energy demands indicated by 
its existing natural gas pipeline net capacity heading to Europe from Russia, Russia’s 
current, even almost flat, natural gas production output, and domestic consumption 
estimates along with Russia’s presently estimated potential for production if energy 
extraction sites are developed in a timely manner.136 In this respect, increased production 
of natural gas by Russia, steadily growing demand in the EU states over the last 
decade,137 dwindling European gas fields, and Russian proximity to Europe, lead the 
European Union states to look forward to seeing Russia as its key supplier of natural gas. 
Further, the growing energy–demand issue gained higher consideration in Europe after 
Germany’s declaration of its strategy to phase out nuclear energy by 2022.138 Moreover, 
rough calculations foresee that by 2030 more than 60 percent of the European domestic 
gas consumption would be covered by the hydrocarbons imported from Russia.139   
In summary, “different interests within Europe” put Russia in an advantageous 
position to apply economic leverage over Europe to advance Russia’s political will. 140 
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Thus, increasing European reliance on Russian energy sources and Russia’s consequent 
growing economic dominance in the European energy market precondition assertive 
Russian foreign policy through hypothetical European fear of sudden withdrawal of 
critical energy resources.  
C. RUSSIA-EUROPE ENERGY INTERDEPENDENCE  
A simple explanation of economic relations between market actors is that a 
consumer and a supplier are mutually interested in trading commodities to make the 
former better off and to “maximize utility” for the latter.141 In this respect, energy trade, 
or interdependence, between Russia and European states should be mutually beneficial, 
making both supplier and consumer comfortable. Indeed, Europe needs energy, precisely, 
natural gas, because its demand is steadily growing; and Russia needs money and its 
main revenue comes from hydrocarbon exports; and, key to the relationship, the most 
high-paying of Russia’s customers are West European states, such as Germany and 
Italy.142 Russia “finds” itself “substantially financially dependent on Europe”143 and 
Europe heavily relies on cleaner energy as articulated in the “Green Paper on Energy 
Policy,” issued by the European Commission in 2000.144 
The cheapest way to deliver the natural gas commodity is through a pipeline 
system once it has been constructed. The construction itself requires tremendous up-front 
investments and typically takes up to 25-year “commitments from buyers/users of the gas 
to purchase enough to justify the development cost.” Once the pipeline is built and the 
seller and the buyer are “physically” connected by a pipeline, it gives a supplier 
“tremendous market power” over its consumer because of the high building cost for a 
“competitive pipeline” for a low marginal “cost per unit of energy transported.”145 In the 
case of Russia-Europe energy relations, the existing natural gas transportation system was 
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built during the Soviet times; and Russia, having avoided the necessity of major 
investments involvement in pipelines construction, appeared in a position of “effective 
monopoly”146 over energy resources streaming from Asia to Europe because of a lack of 
other major alternative routes connecting the former and the latter.  
At the same time, different European Union states have different degrees of 
reliance on energy imported from Russia. Even though an absolute amount of the overall 
imported gas supply from Russia constitutes about one third of the total of the European 
Union consumption, seven of the European Union states (Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Finland, Romania, and Slovakia) import 100 percent of their natural gas from 
Russia; six of them (Greece, Austria, Hungary, Czech Republic, Poland, and Slovenia) 
rely on Russian natural gas imports for more than 50 percent.147 Further, ten EU states 
newly accepted into the EU after the European Union enlargement in 2004 and 2007 (the 
former Soviet bloc countries from East and Central Europe) have a legacy of a highly 
developed energy relationship with Russia, developed over decades.148 Such a bias in 
existing energy cooperation between the European Union individual states and Russia, 
namely, the different levels of their dependency on Russian natural gas, creates a 
precondition for a variety of tensions between the European Union as a supranational 
political entity and the European Union individual states in terms of shaping and 
implementing a common energy security policy for the European Union.  
Certainly, each state seeks the best ways possible to protect its own national 
interests. That also applies to the national energy security. Inequality of economic 
development among the European Union states and each state’s unique geographical 
location (from land-locked East to sea access in the West and South) do affect a choice of 
how much and where to obtain energy resources to run their economies efficiently. 
Undeniably, industrialized European economies, such as Germany, France, and Italy, 
would definitely need more resources to cover their energy needs than those that lag. For 
instance, after the March 2011 Fukushima disaster, German political leadership decided 
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to shut down Germany’s nuclear power plants by the end of 2022149 and then gradually 
substitute that power source with “green” natural gas, mainly from Russia through the 
Nord Stream pipeline. Simultaneously, France and Poland, to lessen their energy 
dependence on other suppliers, are conceptualizing a construction of new nuclear power–
generating facilities.150 Thus, prioritization of the national economic interests by each the 
European Union members over collective ones inevitably undermines the European 
Union’s capability to act effectively as a single voice to deal with any challenges this 
political entity may face. 
To secure demand for natural gas in the European energy market, Russia bound a 
number of European states with long-term contracts on a “take-or-pay” basis. That means 
that, regardless of what volume of natural gas is taken, countries should pay for the 
amount of gas previously negotiated.151 Therefore, any attempt to move away from the 
current supplier would mean a significant amount of money to be paid for the untaken 
resources until the contract expires. To Russia’s advantage, the land-locked East 
European states cannot even aspire in the short-run to substitute Russian natural gas from 
alternative sources. LNG could be an option but its economic viability is currently 
doubtful because of the high cost of LNG terminal construction and transportation from 
degasified LNG terminals located on the Mediterranean coast.152 In other words, Russia 
enjoys a “natural monopoly”153 on natural gas delivery to certain European Union states 
for a minimum of another 10–15 years,154 meaning that they would remain totally reliant 
upon Russian energy resources in the near term until an effective substitution is 
conceived. 
European Union-Russia energy cooperation is not reciprocal. The main concern 
of European energy security policy is to ensure security and sustainability of supplies. 
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Diversification of supplies as a key element of the energy security policy155 can be 
achieved only through implementation of “market rules and competition principles,”156 
allowing other actors fair access to the energy market assets, including Gazprom. 
Conversely, to secure energy demand by high-paying European customers, Russia strives 
for market monopolization with concurrent restriction of foreign investments in its 
domestic energy market. Further, to maximize control over energy flow to Europe to the 
highest possible extent, Russia, through the state-own Gazprom Company, strives for 
deeper expansion into the European energy market through long-term contracts with 
existing customers and direct investments into upstream projects of other present and 
potential European energy suppliers in Africa, the Middle East, the Caspian Basin, and 
even Latin America.157 At the time, to maintain energy supply flow and to meet the 
steadily increasing European demand for energy that is growing faster than Russia’s 
currently almost flat output, Russia has to buy a significant portion of natural gas from 
the Caspian region and Central Asia.158 Moreover, while a number of Russian gas fields 
remain untapped, foreign investors are not welcomed to develop new fields on their own. 
Russia insists on participation in such projects of the state-controlled companies, 
particularly Gazprom. Otherwise Russian government suppresses foreign investors, 
imposing certain obstacles by selective application of the legislation.159 In accordance 
with classical argumentation against involvement of external investments is the argument 
that “foreign investments have often been seen as giving outside investor undue influence 
within one’s country” and could be interpreted as “violations of sovereignty.”160 In this 
respect, wide investor engagement in Russia’s energy market would mean its 
liberalization and, as a consequence, weakened state monopoly over extraction, 
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transportation, and distribution of the critical source of energy that might be used as a 
“tool of [economic and political] coercion.”161 As long as the European Union members 
and Russia apply different strategies with regard to security of demand and supply, their 
energy relationships could be called merely reciprocal. 
D. CONCLUSION 
In this chapter, I argued that Russia possesses the tools and sufficient conditions 
to use economic leverage as an instrument of foreign policy to project the state’s power, 
in particular vis-à-vis the European Union states. Power projection could effectively be 
performed by withdrawal of the critical amount of energy resources. In that way, 
economic leverage is substituted for the military potential that is traditionally envisioned 
as a tool of state coercion. Historically formed Europe-Russia energy cooperation, 
Europe’s geographical immediacy to Russia, enormous amount of energy reserves in 
Russia’s possession, and rapid growth of energy demand by the European countries 
eventually put Europe into a significant degree of dependency on Russian energy 
supplies. Further, domestic resources allocation and the level of energy production across 
Europe, along with diversity in economic development and reliance on energy imports by 
each individual European state, produce the existing divergence of opinions within the 
European Union on how the common energy security policy should be shaped. Further, 
as long as the European Union is just a political entity and thus does not and cannot 
import even a bit of energy, pursuance of individual national interests dominates the 
common ones. Thus, the diversity of opinions and interests across the European Union, 
complemented by various levels of dependency on Russian hydrocarbons, favor Russia 
over Europe politically as it enjoys absolute unilateralism in decision making with respect 
to its foreign policy. In addition, energy cooperation between Europe and Russia is 
asymmetrically interdependent. The actors do not share the approach with regard to 
security of demand and security of supply. To secure demand, Russia seeks ways to 
monopolize the energy market domestically and internationally, imposing state control 
through the state-owned companies while Europe strives for security of supply through 
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diversification and energy market liberalization. Thus, excessive state involvement into 
determining Russian energy policy leads to an assumption that Russia would use the 
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IV.  MAIN CHALLENGES FOR EUROPEAN ENERGY SECURITY 
Concurrent asymmetric interdependence between Europe and Russia stipulated by 
the “lock-in” nature of the pipeline system connecting Europe and Russia163 imposes 
certain economic and political challenges for the European multilateralism. Recently, 
back in 2006 and 2009, European economy was severely impacted by major abrupt cut-
offs of Russian natural gas supply inflow. Those abruptions initiated a round of talks on 
growing importance of security of energy supply, European critical dependency on 
Russia, particularly for its natural gas, and put in doubt Russia’s reliability as a reliable 
energy trader164. In political dimension, those energy flow disruptions have been viewed 
as an emergence of energy as an economic weapon as an instrument of state power to 
pursue political objectives165.   
After unprecedented gas disruption in 2009 due to gas disputes between Russia 
and Ukraine166 that left Europe without Russian gas supply for about two weeks called, 
European energy consumers were forced to seek ways to mitigate possible consequences 
of future energy cut-offs, if there are any, through diversification of supply167. However, 
for Europe, options to diversify away from Russia to undergo increased energy reliance 
on Russia are limited.168 There are three major ways to mitigate such a dependency and 
secure energy supplies flow to Europe: Nabucco pipeline project connecting the Caspian 
region and bypassing Russia, South Stream project that links Russia and Europe and 
bypasses major transit states such as Ukraine, and further development of natural gas 
delivery in liquefied form. 
Simultaneously, the European Union as a political actor strives for establishment 
and application of a multilateral approach to counter “the historically-evolved energy 
relations between individual European countries and Russia.” It attempts to act as a 
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centralized authority on behalf of all the European Union members offering a unified 
framework for energy cooperation between the European Union and Russia and 
promoting unity of actions towards implementation of common “energy policy 
principles” across the European Union.169  
China’s rapid economic growth of 2000s and its increased energy demand 
induced China to look for external energy resources. Tough negotiations with Russia 
stalled with gas pricing stirred Chinese energy cooperation with hydrocarbon-rich Central 
Asian states. In turn, intensified energy cooperation across Asia diversifies energy away 
from Europe further limiting its energy diversification prospective to develop a southern 
energy corridor and lessening dependence on Russian fossil fuels.  
This chapter will describe possible diversification options for Europe to further 
promote competition in energy market in order to reduce growing reliance on Russian 
hydrocarbons, what the European Union does to develop collective vision on energy 
security challenges that are in conflict with interests of the European Union individual 
states, and current dynamics of energy cooperation across Asia and how it may affect 
European energy security. 
A. DIVERSIFICATION OPTIONS 
To restore its reputation as a reliable energy supplier to Europe after 2006 and 
2009 cut-offs, Russia consistently persuades the European Union regarding the necessity 
to accelerate construction of the South Stream project that is to connect Russia and 
Europe bypassing Ukraine which is currently the major transit state for Russian gas 
deliveries to Europe. Russia backs its position by blaming Ukraine to being inconsistent 
to fulfill assumed transit obligations170. Therefore, Russia insists that the energy flow 
through “unfriendly” transit nations should certainly be avoided.171 Cost estimation of the 
pipeline construction across the bottom of the Black Sea at about €19–24 billion172 
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reasonably questions economic viability of the project: it would not deliver additional 
quantity of gas to Europe; to bypass Ukraine, 63 billion cubic meters of gas173 would be 
simply diverted from the Ukrainian transit structure.174 In total, the South Stream 
complemented by the Nord Stream pipeline with 55 bcm of natural gas transportation 
capacity per annum175 would be able to abolish significance of the Ukrainian pipeline, 
which currently accounts for transportation of about 120 bcm of natural gas to European 
consumers annually176. Additionally, Russia would keep enjoying overall near-monopoly 
over all volume of natural gas heading down to Europe from Russia, Caspian region177, 
and Central Asia178. Thus, Europe presumably would gain more assurance with respect to 
consistency of energy flow but dependency on Russia as key energy exporter would 
likely remain unchanged. 
Competitive to the South Stream, Nabucco pipeline project intents to reduce 
dependence on “importing natural gas solely from Russia”179. With estimated annual 
delivery capacity of 31 bcm180, Nabucco project also falls into a framework of the 
“Energy Security and Solidarity Action Plan” of the European Union that postulates the 
“developing a southern gas corridor for the supply of gas from Caspian region and 
Middle Eastern sources”181 and became “flagship project” of the European energy 
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security policy182. Even though its construction is more than two times cheaper (€7.9 
billion183) compared to the South Stream project, investors still doubt whether up-front 
investments would yield immediate output as Nabucco faces a major obstacle to run the 
piping if there would be enough resources found to fill the pipeline with natural gas.184 
Initially, Iran was regarded as a major gas provider for Nabucco. But due to the ongoing 
disputes around the Iranian nuclear program, Iranian gas is unlikely to be used until the 
crisis is over.185 Alternative way to get required volume of natural for Nabucco pipeline 
would be an access to the fossil resources of the former Soviet republics in the Central 
Asia. So far, this option is not feasible for two reasons. First, disagreement over the 
legitimate status of the Caspian Sea between its littoral states – “whether it should be 
treated as a sea or a lake” – is still unresolved186 which inevitably does not allow 
constructing a pipeline on the bottom of the Caspian Sea. Second, Russia “tied up 
available and future supplies of Central Asian gas in long-term Gazprom contracts.”187 
Hence, even though Nabucco diversification option makes political and commercial 
sense, it is unlikely to be implemented in foreseeable future because of lack visible 
solutions to overcome aforecited difficulties quickly.188 
Another option for Europe to diversify energy supplies away from Russia is to 
further develop LNG facilities relying on African and Middle East producers. This option 
is feasible but costlier than others. LNG projects are quite capital-intense and also require 
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substantial up-front investments and commitments by both producers and consumers189. 
For the sake of security of supply, reliance on LNG option would require sufficient of 
amount of liquefaction and de-gasification facilities and LNG transportation means. To 
ensure security of demand, “the system of long-term contracts and their constant renewal 
would need to be set up.” Both issues of security of supply and security of demand are 
key determinants that stipulate inevitability of high-fixed costs for the LNG choice. 
Besides that, if LNG is commercially viable for the states with immediate sea access or 
not far away from it, this option hardly makes economic sense for the land-locked ones, 
in particular for the Central European states, which already obtain energy supplies from 
Russia via pipelines.190 Thus, due to significantly higher cost involved to develop LNG 
infrastructure, it is anticipated that LNG share in the European natural gas market, being 
currently at the level of about 20 per cent191, would remain modest as it is over the next 
couple decades.192 Indeed, to some extent LNG would reduce growing dependency on 
Russia’s natural gas, especially for the West European states193, but is unlikely to align 
existing asymmetric interdependence in the European Union-Russia energy cooperation. 
B. THE EUROPEAN UNION’S ACTIONS REGARDING COMMON 
ENERGY POLICY VIS-À-VIS RUSSIA  
To deal with existing peculiarities stemming out of so-called “energy security 
dilemma”194 in collaborating triangle – the European Union, the European Union 
individual states, and Russia, the European Union attempts to function an “integrator 
motor”195 to shape and implement a common energy security policy in both external and 
internal dimensions aiming to create a unilateral approach by the European Union 
members to withstand concurrent heterogeneous energy dependency, particularly on 
Russian fossil resources. Indeed, European-Russian and energy cooperation across 
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Europe gained certain novel characteristics after appearance of a new actor, namely the 
European Union that advances a unified energy policy on behalf of the European Union 
members without actually importing “a single cubic meter of gas”196. At the same time, 
implementation of the unified approach towards collective energy security is often in 
conflict existing forms of energy cooperation, namely between individual European states 
and Russia.197   
Before establishment of the European Union, the first attempt to conceptualize a 
common approach for unified energy policy within the European Economic Community 
was taken back in 1988 emphasizing the importance of application of free market 
principles in the internal European energy market.198 After dissolution of the Soviet 
Union, substantial consequent changes on the European political map along with 
appearance of new actors known as energy transit states, and entrance of a new political 
entity, namely the European Union, called for revision of the existing energy policy 
seeking new arrangements of energy cooperation between the European and other states. 
At the beginning of 1990s, the European Union launched an initiative initiated with a 
purpose to “build a legal foundation for energy security, based on the principles of open, 
competitive markets and sustainable development”199. This notion has been reflected in 
“Energy Charter Treaty” (ECT) with primary emphasis on the development of common 
rules to “provide a more balanced and efficient framework for international cooperation 
than is offered by bilateral agreements.” The Treaty was signed in December 1994 by 
fifty-one states embracing majority of the European countries, transit states (Ukraine, 
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force in April 1998200 (Russia has not ratified the Treaty and officially informed other 
signatories on lack of such intentions201).  
Applying the Treaty provisionally, Russia refused to ratify it insisting that the 
ratification would undermine “the country’s economic interests”202. In fact, the key 
reason was a lack of agreement between the European Union and Russia over the 
provisions of the Transit protocol of the Energy Charter. Russia insisted that “the 
document should include the ‘right of first refusal’ if a long-term supply contract … does 
not match the long-term transit contract” literally granting a “third-party access” to the 
Russian gas transportation system, especially for the Caspian energy producers203. 
Conversely, The European Union stands for “the non-discriminating access of companies 
and other countries to Russian pipelines, primarily the gas transportation network 
controlled by state-owned gas holding Gazprom”204. If that happened, Russia literally 
would have “to give up its near-monopolistic control over energy transit”205 and become 
a just transit state for the Caspian and Central Asian producers.206  
The failure of negotiations with Russia over the content of the Energy Charter 
Treaty induced the European Union to seek other forms of energy cooperation with 
Russia. During the “EU-Russia Summit in Paris in October 2000” it was agreed to launch 
a separate “The European Union–Russia Energy Dialogue.”207 The European Union 
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Commission as a supranational authority was mandated by the European Union member 
states to offer the Russian government de facto bilateral form of energy cooperation. In 
addition to “institutional, technical, and financial assistance” provisioned by the Energy 
Charter Treaty208, the European Union offered Russia to “participate in the development 
of the EU’s internally integrated [energy] market.”209 At the same time negotiations 
within the framework of the European Union–Russia Energy Dialogue are always tough 
when the issue of fossil resources is raised. The main obstacle once again lays in 
divergence of strategic interests of the two actors. Whilst Russia seeks “long-term 
contracts for natural gas, … investments and technology, participation in the European 
Investment Bank, and removing limits on imports of energy products,” the European 
Union, to enhance security of supply, strives for the “opening … Russian energy market” 
and fair conditions for investments.210  
To further develop a unanimous multilateral approach towards collective energy 
security, in November 2008 the European Union adopted “The European Union Energy 
Security and Solidarity Action Plan” emphasizing on insufficiency of “specific national 
solutions” in relation to “the integration of energy markets and infrastructures within the 
European Union” and necessity to “develop a vision for 2050.”211 Simultaneously, 
steadily growing energy consumption across the European Union raised serious 
environmental concerns that have been highlighted in “The EU Climate and Energy 
Package.” The Package envisions reduction by 20 per cent of “greenhouse gas 
emissions,” “20 per cent of European Union energy consumption to come from 
renewable resources energy,” and reduction by 20 per cent “in primary energy use 
compared with projected levels … by improving energy efficiency” that are to be 
fulfilled by 2020. To converge the provisions stated in the two policy papers cited above 
with intended outcome to strengthen the European Union’s ability to act unanimously and 
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to modernize energy cooperation with Russia acknowledging its continuously growing 
importance as energy supplier, in February 2011 the European Union complementing the 
EU-Russia existing energy dialog policies solidified an intention to develop another long-
term EU-Russia cooperation strategy in the form of “the EU-Russia Roadmap for 
Cooperation in the Energy Sector until 2050.”212 
Thus, the European Union is persistently looking for different ways to improve 
the level of energy cooperation with energy suppliers through developing numerous 
strategies and concepts. Besides everything else, they intend to mitigate existing various 
levels of interdependence on imported energy resources between the European Union 
individual states and other energy importers and strengthen the European Union’s 
capability to act unanimously to withstand existing and potential threats to the European 
security. 
C. CENTRAL ASIAN ENERGY COOPERATION AND EUROPEAN 
ENERGY SECURITY 
In addition to current strategy to maintain dominance in the European energy 
market213, Russia also looks eastward for extensive energy cooperation with energy 
demanding Chinese and East Asian economies214. Key elements of the eastern energy 
strategy were settled in the “Eastern Gas Program” issued by the Russian Federation 
Industry and Energy Ministry in September 2007. This is a “state-run Development 
Program for an integrated gas production, transportation and supply system in Eastern 
Siberia and the Far East, taking into account potential gas exports to China and other 
Asia-Pacific countries.” This program envisions development gas fields and gas output 
growth in Russian Eastern Siberia and the Far East to satisfy needs for natural gas of by 
potential Chinese and east Asian customers.215 
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China’s Economic boom of the 2000’ set the most opportunistic and highly 
economically viable outlook for Russia to deepen energy relations with China.216 
Likewise, China also views Russia as an important future energy trade partner from 
several important reasons. First, strategic significance of their geographical proximity217 
allows connecting upstream and downstream projects with lower cost and avoiding 
reliance on intermediaries.218 Second, China is also seriously concerned about 
diversifying energy supplies to enhance its energy security.219 Finally, China is the 
world’s highest CO2 emitter because of its predominantly coal-based domestic energy 
production; consequently, it anticipates international pressure regarding growing 
environmental issues.220 Currently, there is no decision has been made upon beginning of 
the construction of gas pipelines. The main issue the sides cannot agree upon is the gas 
price. China stands for lower gas prices emphasizing the necessity of maintaining 
competition with alternative sources of domestic energy production, namely coal. Russia, 
on the other hand, attempts to cooperate with China the way as it does with Europe 
through “long-term contracts for the gas deliveries.” As Russian official pointed out, such 
a long-term commitment is “the basis for the decision on building a pipeline.”221 
Therefore, unless demand for the gas is secured, Russia is unlikely to put much effort to 
develop the Siberian gas fields. 
Lack of consensus over the gas pricing with Russia and ambiguity over future 
intensity of gas cooperation with Russia induced China to rely more on alternative 
sources of energy, including those in the Central Asia, namely Kazakhstan and 
Turkmenistan222. Currently, Turkmenistan, that “holds the world’s fourth-largest natural 
                                                 
216 Indra Overland and Kyrre Elvenes Broekhus, “Chinese Perspectives on Russian Oil and Gas,” in 
Russian Energy Power and Foreign Relations: Implications for Conflict and Cooperation, eds. Jeronim 
Perovic et al. (New York: Routledge Taylor & Francis Group, 2009), 208. 
217 Ibid., 201. 
218 Ibid., 209–210. 
219 Ibid., 201. 
220 Ibid., 212. 
221 Poussenkova, “Gasprom and Russia’s Great Dreams,” 8. 
222 Xuanli Liao, “Central Asia and China’s Energy Security,” China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly 4 
(2006): 61–69, accessed May 22, 
2012http://www.silkroadstudies.org/new/docs/CEF/Quarterly/November_2006/Liao.pdf. 
 53
gas reserves”223, is the only Central Asian state that ships its air hydrocarbons to China 
via pipeline net since December 2009224 with projected export annual capacity of 40 
bcm225. Simultaneously, China negotiates on gas deliveries with Kazakhstan and 
Turkmenistan. In September 2011, China and Kazakhstan agreed on launching a pipeline 
construction that would link Kazakh gas fields with existing transportation network, that 
originates in Turkmenistan and crosses Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan and terminates in 
China226, and add another 15 bcm of natural gas for China. 227 It is expected that 
Kazakhstan could increase annual export volumes up to 40 bcm by 2015228. In addition, 
China agreed with Uzbekistan to acquire up to 4 bcm of Uzbek natural gas to be shipped 
in 2012. It also anticipated that the natural gas export to China would be increased up to 9 
bcm in 2013229.  
A key implication for the European security strategy in deepening energy 
cooperation between China and Central European energy suppliers is that the volumes of 
natural gas that would be enough to fill Nabucco pipeline would have been secured by 
other consumers, specifically China. Even though Russia would inevitably lose “its 
monopsony position as buyer of Central Asian gas”230, it would retain its monopoly over 
transportation already contracted gas from Asia to Europe and enjoy remaining strong 
European reliance on Russian fossil fuels.231 Another serious challenge for the European 
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energy security might appear if Russia would link West and East Siberia energy fields232 
and if Russia and China would overcome the gas price disagreement. Russia would no 
longer be dependent on Europe for its energy sales,233 demand for Russian fossils and 
revenue would secured in case of politically motivated disruptions of energy flow to the 
European market234. 
D. CONCLUSION 
None of possible diversification options would resolve the European energy 
security dilemma. The South Stream project proposed and accelerated by Russia would 
secure energy supply but retain heavy dependency on Russian fossil fuels. Nabucco 
project, the cheapest and the only effective option to significantly reduce dependence on 
Russian energy, has vague prospects due to the lack of viable options to fill up the pipe 
with gas. LNG option is not a decisive one. It is capital-intense and requires special and 
expensive infrastructure that substantially time-consuming to make it operational.  
To withstand and overcome existing asymmetric interdependence, the European 
Union uses political tools across the European Union to pursue its members to act 
unanimously to fulfill provisions of the common security policy. Due to varying degrees 
of dependence on Russian energy resources, those efforts are often opposed by the 
member states that prioritize national interests over supranational as long as energy 
security of each individual state is not delegated to the supranational authority. That 
makes the European Union weak and vulnerable in dealings with present and possible 
future threats to European security. 
At the first glance, present dynamics of energy cooperation in Asia undermines 
Russian energy superpower ambitions by reducing its influence in energy markets in the 
former Soviet republics in Central Asia by allowing the diversion of energy resources to 
China that potentially could be sold to the European Union states235. In fact, this weakens 
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European opportunities to find enough natural gas for the Nabucco pipeline allows Russia 
to maintain monopoly over energy transit from Central Asia to Europe and keeps Europe 
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V.  CONCLUSION  
Russia’s foreign policy can be best explained within a framework of the political 
realism theory that describes the world as an anarchic realm, and state actors are to use 
instruments of power to survive. The current status of the Russian military presumably 
could not be strong enough to be used effectively as a tool of the state’s power as the 
theory suggests. Unprecedented cut-offs of energy flow from Russia to Europe in 2006 
and 2009 lead to an impression of the economic weapon being used through manipulation 
of critical energy supplies, threatening other actors with the possibility of severe 
economic loss and creating panic among the population, with an effect nearly equal to 
that resulting from the use of military force but without actual physical destruction and 
massive loss of lives. In this respect, the rational explanation for Russia’s international 
conduct would be its reliance on key components of its economy that are highly crucial 
to, and in high demand by, other states, that is, reliance  on its enormous amount of 
energy resources but not on its weak military. For maximization of its economic leverage 
vis-à-vis other states for political reasons, the necessary condition for Russia should be to 
impose state control over energy production, transportation, and distribution to the 
consumers as was actually done during Vladimir Putin’s first presidency with oil and 
natural gas monopolists Sibneft and Gazprom.  
The historically formed energy cooperation between Russia and European states, 
especially those that happened to be members of the European Union, can be described as 
asymmetric and gives Russia all necessary preconditions to use economic leverage as an 
instrument of foreign policy. First, there are already existing and operational energy 
transportation routes that connect Russian energy extraction fields and European 
consumers. Second, the European fossil fuels production is declining while demand for 
energy is steadily growing, and the amount of energy resources in Russia is large enough 
to satisfy European needs. Third, the degree of dependency on Russian energy across the 
European Union varies from no dependence to complete dependence; this differentiates 
approaches to energy security in every single case. This also weakens the political unity 
of the European Union to counter possible Russian assertive foreign behavior by 
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imposing tools of economic coercion on Europe. Finally, the European Union lacks 
sufficient diversification of energy supplies to lessen the existing critical reliance on 
Russian hydrocarbons. All options are either capital-intensive and require significant 
upfront investments or could put the European consumers into a deeper energy 
dependence on Russia, which might be converted into a political one. Development of the 
southern energy corridor is considered to be the only politically and economically viable 
option for the European Union to diversify its energy supplies, but its future is vague. 
Certain obstacles stemming from unresolved problems over the Iranian nuclear program, 
the unsettled issue of the legal status of the Caspian Sea that does not allow connecting 
Central Asia and Europe while bypassing Russia, and recently intensified energy 
cooperation in Asia makes it unclear who is going to provide enough energy to justify the 
pipeline construction cost.   
Thus, by replacing the military as a tool of state power with economic means, 
Russia could rely on the energy matter as a “bargaining tool”236 to pursue its political 
goals and objectives, especially in Europe. 
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